The Taiwan Strait Relations was sponsored by the Chinese American Professional Society in Los Angeles on October 27, 2002. One of the speakers, Dr. Hong-chao Tai expressed his views on two areas.
(1) Radical economic and political changes on the two sides of the Taiwan strait, In the last ten years, from 1992 to 2002, the relative economic positions of mainland China and Taiwan have dramatically changed, as seen in the following statistics (data cover mainly the 1992-2001 period; all currency figures in US dollars): (a). GNP: Mainland, rose from $419.5 billion to 1,020 billion, a two and half times increase; Taiwan, from $212 billion to $286.9 billion; a one-third increase. (b) GNP growth rate: Mainland, in 1992, 9.5%, in 2001, 7.6%; Taiwan, in 1992, 10.98%, in 2001, -2.25%. (c) Taiwan's investment on the mainland rose from $863 million in 1991 to $50 billion in 2001. Together with a dramatic rise in cross-strait trade (from $77 million in 1987 to $233.8 billion in 2001), Taiwan's investments on the mainland have created a robust business triangle: Taiwan receives merchandise orders from overseas market; mainland's Taiwan-invested factories produce merchandise for export to the US and other overseas destinations. The merchandise involved in the triangle ranges from labor-intensive goods such as clothing and shoes to high tech produces such as computer peripherals, and the volume is rising rapidly. The net result of these economic changes is that the economic miracle of Taiwan in the pre-1992 period has been replaced by the present stupendous economic growth on the mainland. Translated into political terms, the economic changes signify: (a) Mainland's resources for military and diplomatic activities will rise accordingly. (b) Mainland's influence on Taiwan's internal politics will increase over time as Taiwanese businessmen associated with mainland investment and trade will rise in number and strength. (c) Whereas the question of Taiwan will little affect the politics on the mainland, the issue of Strait relations will dominate Taiwan's politics. To the extent the issue is not settled, it will cause continuing political instability in Taiwan.
(2) The meaning of Bush-Jiang summit in Texas. The summit could not resolve the substantive issues the US and China face today. For Jiang Zemin, together with his senior colleagues at the top decision-making body, the Politburo, will soon be replaced as China's leaders. Besides, the few hours that Jiang and Bush spent together at the summit could not afford enough opportunity for them to resolve such thorny problems as Taiwan's relation with the mainland, North Korea's nuclear arms development, human rights, and antiterrorism. Yet all these issues were touched upon. Herein lies the symbolic significance of the summit. To Jiang, he would use the opportunity to pass on to his political successors a message: the US and China are reaching a transition point, between a period of potential antagonism and that of guarded cooperation. To Bush, he wants China to embrace his global antiterrorist campaign, particularly China's-perhaps, muted--endorsement of the anti-Iraq resolution at the United Nations Security Council.