The Pentagon released the 2005 annual report on Chinese military power on July 19, 2005. The report is required each year in pursuance to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. The 45-page report contains six chapters: (1) Key Developments; (2) Understanding China's Strategy; (3) China's Military Strategy and Doctrine; (4) Resources for Force Modernization; (5) Force Modernization Goals and Trends; (6) PRC Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait.
Its "Executive Summary" is as follows:
The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is one of the principal elements in the emergence of East Asia, a region that has changed greatly over the past quarter of a century. China's emergence has significant implications for the region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, one that becomes integrated as a constructive member of the international community. But, we see a China facing a strategic crossroads. Questions remain about the basic choices China's leaders will make as China's power and influence grow, particularly its military power.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparations to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China's periphery. PLA modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options for Taiwan scenarios.
In the short term, the PRC appears focused on preventing Taiwan independence or trying to compel Taiwan to negotiate a settlement on Beijing's terms. A second set of objectives include building counters to third-party, including potential U.S. intervention in cross-Strait crises. PLA preparations, including an expanding force of ballistic missiles (long-range and short-range) cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems, come against the background of policy toward Taiwan that espouses "peaceful reunification." China has not renounced the use of force, however. Over the long term, if current trends persist, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region.
The PLA is working toward these goals by acquiring new foreign and domestic weapon systems and military technologies, promulgating new doctrine for modern warfare, reforming military institutions, personnel development and professionalization, and improving exercise and training standards. We assess that China's ability to project conventional military power beyond its periphery remains limited.
This report outlines what we know of China's national and military strategies, progress and trends in its military modernization, and their implications for regional security and stability. But, secrecy envelops most aspects of Chinese security affairs. The outside would has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making and of key capabilities supporting PLA modernizations. Hence, the findings and conclusions are based on incomplete data. These gaps are, of necessity, bridged by informed judgement.
The PLA's routine publication of a biannual Defense White Paper demonstrates some improvement in transparency. However, China's leaders continue to guard closely basic information on the quantity and quality of the Chinese armed forces. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense still does not know the full size and composition of Chinese government expenditure on national defense. Estimates put it at two to three times the officially published figures.
The report does not consider China's military power a threat to U.S. security, but a serious threat to Taiwan
The report points out that the cross-Strait balance of power is shifting toward Beijing as a result of China's economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA's military capabilities, including those that provide Beijing options short or full-scale invasions.
The reports outlines China's courses of action against Taiwan: persuasion and coercion, limited force options, such as nuclear weapon/high-attitude EMP (high-attitude electromagnetic pulse), air and missile campaign, blockade, and amphibious invasions.
The report provides China and Taiwan forces data as follows:
| China | Taiwan | ||
| Total | Taiwan StraitArea | Total | |
| Personnel (active) | 1.6 million | 375,000 | 200,000 |
| Group Armies | 18 | 9 | |
| Infantry Divisons/Brigades (including airborne | 20/20 | 9/11 | 0/25 |
| Armor Divisions/Brigades | 10/10 | 4/4 | 0/5 |
| Mech Infantry Divisions/Bridages | 5/5 | 3/1 | 0/3 |
| Artillery Divisions Brigades | 5/15 | 3/5 | 0/0 |
| Marine Divisions/Brigades | 0/2 | 1/3 | |
| Tanks | 6,500 | 2,500 | 1,900 |
| Artillery Pieces | 11,000 | 5,500 | 4,400 |
| Note: The PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and military units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throuhout the PLA's seven Military Regions (MRs). A significant portion of these assets are delpoyed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan military regions. In a major Taiwan conflict, personnel, units, and equipment from other military regions would augment existing combat power in the Taiwan Strait area. In 2004, Taiwan began transforming motorized rifle and armored infantry brigades to mechanized infantry. | |||
| China | Taiwan | ||
| Aircraft | Total | Within range of Taiwan | Total |
| Fighters | 1,500 | 425 | 420 |
| Bombers | 780 | 280 | 0 |
| Transport | 500 | 50 | 40 |
| Note: The PLAFF and PLANAF have a total of around 2,600 combat aircraft: air defense and multi-role fighters ground attach aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 470 older fighters and bombers are assigned to PLA flight academies or R$D. The two air arms have over 90 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with photographic, surface search, and airborne early warning sensors. The PLAAF and PLANAF have 500 transports. The majority of PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft are based in the eastern part of the country, Currently, more thjan 700 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. Taiwan has some 400 fighters of various types | |||
| China | Taiwan | ||
| Total | East and South Sea Fleets | Total | |
| Personnel | 290,000 | 140,000 | 60,000 |
| Destroyers | 21 | 13 | 6 |
| Frigatest | 43 | 34 | 21 |
| Tank landing ships | 23 | 15 | 4 |
| Medium landing ships | 23 | 15 | 4 |
| Diesel submarines | 51 | 29 | 4 |
| Nuclear Submarines | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Costal Patrol (Missile) | 51 | 34 | 50 |
| Note: The PLA Navy has a large fleet that includes 64 major surface combatants, approximately 55 attack submarines, more than 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and some 50 coastal missile patrol craft. Two-thirds of those assets are located in the East and South Sea Fleets. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, both fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coasts, but would provide mission critical assets to support the other fleets. | |||