Henry A. Kissinger, former secretary of state, now chairman of Kissinger Associates. In his article, "China: Containment Won't Work," in Washington Post, June 13, 2005, pointed out some wrong directions of U.S. policy and considered the Taiwan issue should be dealt with in a negotiating framework. Below is the article's summary:
The relationship between the United States and China is beset by ambiguity. On the one hand, it represents perhaps the most consistent expression of a bipartisan, long-range American foreign policy. Starting with Richard Nixon, seven presidents have affirmed the importance of cooperative relations with China and the U.S. commitment to a one-China policy -- albeit with temporary detours at the beginning of the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. . .
Nevertheless, ambivalence has suddenly reemerged. Various officials, members of Congress and the media are attacking China's policies, from the exchange rate to military buildup, much of it in a tone implying China is on some sort of probation. To many, China's rise has become the most significant challenge to U.S. security.
China's emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong.
Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalized world of nuclear weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants; there would be no winners; the task of reconstruction would dwarf the causes of the conflict.
Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. . . only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown.
It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War.
U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup. There is no doubt that China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first phase of its economic reform. But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 percent of America's; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and Russia, all bordering China -- not to speak of Taiwan's military modernization supported by American decisions made in 2001. . .
The problem of Taiwan is an exception and is often invoked as a potential trigger. This could happen if either side abandons the restraint that has characterized U.S.-Chinese relations on the subject for over a generation. But it is far from inevitable. Almost all countries -- and all major ones -- have recognized China's claim that Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents of both parties -- none more emphatically than George W. Bush. . . Despite substantial U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Sino-American relations have steadily improved based on three principles: American recognition of the one-China principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan; China's understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and is prepared to vindicate that principle; restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
The task now is to keep the Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework. The recent visits to Beijing by the heads of two of Taiwan's three major parties may be a forerunner. Talks on reducing the buildup in the Taiwan Strait seem feasible.
China, in its own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and developing regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; and the potentially catastrophic impact of a Cold War with the United States on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends. But it does not follow from this that any damage to China caused by a Cold War would benefit America. We would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens, China will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of a stable international system.
Preemption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China's magnitude. It cannot be in our interest to have new generations in China grow up with a perception of a permanently and inherently hostile United States. It cannot be in China's interest to be perceived in America as being exclusively focused on its own narrow domestic or Asian interests.
Attitudes are psychologically important. China needs to be careful about policies seeming to exclude America from Asia and our sensitivities regarding human rights, which will influence the flexibility and scope of the U.S. stance toward China. America needs to understand that a hectoring tone evokes in China memories of imperialist condescension and that it is not appropriate in dealing with a country that has managed 4,000 years of uninterrupted self-government.
In his article, "What to do about China," published in the U.S. News and World Report, June 20, 2005, Richard N. Haass, president of Council on Foreign Relations, analyzed the U.S. foreign policy stating that the Taiwan issue could seriously hurt U.S.-China ties, or even bring the two powers into conflict. Below is an abstract his view.
In the 21st century, the most critical relationship will be that between the United States, today's dominant power, and China, the world's rising power.
Some foreign policy "realists," citing history, argue that China will inevitably challenge American primacy and the United States should seek to prevent China's rise.
One problem with this thinking is that the rise and fall of countries is largely beyond the ability of the United States or any other outsider to control. It is not clear the United States could prevent China's rise even if it wanted Attempting to block China's rise would guarantee its animosity and all but ensure its working against U.S. interests around the world.
The issue for American foreign policy shouldn't be whether China becomes strong but how China uses its growing strength.
China is already working with the United States against terrorism, but the most pressing area for expanded cooperation is North Korea. The other issue that could seriously hurt U.S.-China ties, or even bring the two powers into conflict, is Taiwan. Taiwan must be pressed not to take unilateral steps that would be tantamount to independence and risk a military response from the mainland. China needs to be reminded not to use force to unify the country. Neither China nor Taiwan should count on Washington standing aside if they change the status quo.
Yet another source of growing irritation is trade. China now exports to the United States some $160 billion more than it takes in. What we want to avoid is having trade becoming a source of friction rather than integration.
A final consideration is China's domestic politics. China is more open economically than politically and more open politically than it was a decade ago. But it has a long way to go. The best way to promote democratization is by bolstering the middle class, extending the rule of law, and limiting the role of the state. Such political evolution is crucial; as the lure of communism fades, it is important that nationalism not fill the political and ideological void.
A U.S.-China cold war would be costly, dangerous, and distracting, robbing attention and resources from pressing internal and global challenges. Both countries have a stake in avoiding this outcome; the course of this century will depend in no small part on whether they succeed.