U.S. Department of Defense released May 25 a report to Congress on China military power pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000. China is now building capacity for conventional precision strike:
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (< 1000 km). According to DIA estimates, as of October 2006. the PLA had roughly 900 SRBMs and is increasing its inventory at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year. The PLA's first-generation SRBMs do not possess true "precision strike" capability, but latergenerations have greater ranges and improved accuracy.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1000-3000 km). The PLA is acquiring conventional
MRBMs, apparently to increase the range to which it can conduct precision strikes, to include their
possible use in targeting naval ships operating far from China's shores.
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). China is developing LACMs for stand-off, precision strike capability against hard-targets. First- and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future.
Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs). China is believed to have a small number of tactical ASMs and
precision-guided munitions, including all-weather, satellite-guided and laser-guided bombs, and is pursuing foreign and domestic acquisitions to improve airborne anti-ship capabilities.
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs, from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27B/SIZZLER. The pace of indigenous ASCM research, development and production - and of foreign procurement - has accelerated over the past decade.
Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA has imported Israeli-made HARPY UCAVs and Russian-made antiradiation missiles, and is developing an anti-radiation missile based on the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known domestically as the YJ-91.
Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is deploying the A-100 300 mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and developing the WS-2 400 mm MRL (200 km range). Additional munitions are being fielded or are under development.
The report also mentionsChina's aircraft carrier developments. In October 2006, Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan, vice chairman of the Science and Technology Commission of the PLA's General Armament Department stated that the "Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own . . . [A]ircraft carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in oceans."
China first began to discuss developing an indigenous aircraft carrier in the late 1970s. In 1985, China purchased the Australian carrier the HMAS Melbourne. Although the hull was scrapped, Chinese technicians studied the ship and built a replica of its flight deck for pilot training. China purchased two former Soviet carriers - the Minsk in 1998 and the Kiev in 2000. Neither carrier was made operational; instead, they were used as floating military theme parks. Nevertheless, both provided design information to PLA Navy engineers.
In 1998 China purchased the ex-Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class Soviet carrier that was only 70 percent complete at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse. Recent deck refurbishment, electrical work, fresh hull paint with PLA Navy markings, and expressed interest in Russia's Su-33 fighter has re-kindled debate about a Chinese carrier fl eet. The PLA's ultimate intentions for the Varyag remain unclear, but a number of possibilities exist: turning it into an operational aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a floating theme park - its originally-stated purpose.
Regardless of Beijing's final objective for the ex-Varyag, PLA Navy study of the ship's structural design could eventually assist China in creating its own carrier program. Lieutenant General Wang stated that, "we cannot establish a real naval force of aircraft carriers within three or five years." Some analysts in and out of government predict that China could have an operational carrier by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015); others assess the earliest it could deploy an operational aircraft carrier is 2020 or beyond.
The Report in Chapter Six reviews force modernization and security in the Taiwan Strait.
The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions among policies and actions taken by the mainland, Taiwan, and the United States. China's emergence as a global economic force, increased diplomatic clout, and improved air, naval, and missile forces strengthen Beijing's position relative to Taipei by increasing the mainland's economic leverage over Taiwan, fostering Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, and shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the mainland's favor. Taiwan, meanwhile, has allowed its defense spending to decline in real terms over the past decade, creating an increased urgency for the Taiwan authorities to make the necessary investments to maintain the island's self-defense capabilities.
The U.S. Government has made clear that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait, does not support Taiwan independence, and supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has taken steps to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the region.
In addition to making available to Taiwan defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, the U.S. Department of Defense, through the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion to dictate the terms of Taiwan's future status.
For its part, Taiwan has taken important steps to improve its joint operations capability, strengthen its officer and non-commissioned officer corps, build its reserve stocks, and improve crisis response capabilities. Taiwan has bolstered its defensive capabilities by taking delivery of the final two of four KIDD-class DDGs in September 2006. These improvements have, on the whole, reinforced Taiwan's natural defensive advantages in the face of Beijing's continuing build-up. However, Taiwan has yet to acquire other major end items offered for sale by the United States in 2001, namely, Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems, P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel electric submarines. These systems would enable Taiwan to make necessary improvements to its air and missile defense and anti-submarine warfare capability. In the six years since the offer was made, China has continued to make significant advances, some unexpected, in the capability areas these systems are designed to protect against.
Said the Report, there are factors of deterrence in Beijing's attempt to use force against Taiwan.
China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute.
Beijing's calculus would also have to factor in the potential political and economic repercussions
of military conflict with Taiwan. China's leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is China's single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended campaign would wreck Taiwan's economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs.
International sanctions could further damage Beijing's economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project in the post-Tiananmen years and would taint Beijing's hosting of the 2008 Olympics, for which China's leaders would almost certainly face boycotts and possibly a loss of the games. A confict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning.
Finally, China's leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations - a result that would not be in China's interests.